UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF VERMONT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

VS) CASE NO: 2:16-cr-94-2

DONALD McFARLAN)

_____) MOTION HEARING

BEFORE: HONORABLE GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD

CHIEF DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES: ABIGAIL E. AVERBACH, ESQUIRE

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DATE: September 5, 2017

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(The Court opened at 1:30 p.m.) 1 2 THE CLERK: Your Honor, the matter before the 3 Court is criminal number 16-94-2, United States of America 4 versus Donald McFarlan. Present on behalf of the government 5 is Assistant United States Attorney Abigail Averbach. 6 defendant is present with his attorney Kevin Henry. And we 7 are here on a motion to sever defendants for trial. 8 THE COURT: All right. Afternoon. Nice to see 9 all three of you. 10 MS. AVERBACH: Good afternoon. 11 MR. HENRY: Good afternoon. 12 THE COURT: I've had a chance to read everybody's 13 papers, twice as it happens, but why don't I turn things 14 over to Mr. Henry and hear from you on your motion and then 15 give the government a chance to respond. 16 MR. HENRY: Thank you, Your Honor. Is it your preference that I use the podium? 17 18 THE COURT: Sure. 19 MR. HENRY: Your Honor, I would like to start with 20 a discussion of severance under Rule 8(b) because I frankly 21 think that that's the strongest basis for severance in this 22 case. 23 And, you know, the government seems to be taking 2.4 the position, and I think almost solely, that the basis for 25 joining the human trafficking claims with the drug claims is

the theory that the human or the drug claims somehow fuel the human trafficking claims. As I understand it, that's the essence of their position.

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And there are several problems with that theory as it relates to Rule 8(b). You know, first and foremost, I think as a factual matter the problem with that position is that the human trafficking allegations are alleged to have begun long before the drug distribution claim conspiracy is alleged to have begun.

So just as a factual matter, I don't see how the government can articulate the theory that something, human trafficking that occurred in 2012 was fueled by drug distribution that occurred in 2015. But even if that were true, and even accepting for sake of argument the notion that these crimes can and do go hand in hand at times, under Rule 8(b) that does not satisfy the government's requirements because the indictment, and that is the, you know, the document that we need to start from, because the issue before the Court is whether these charges are properly joined based on what's alleged in the indictment. I mean, the case law is fairly clear on that.

And the indictment doesn't allege any such relationship between the human trafficking claims and the drug distribution claims. They, we simply have a conspiracy to distribute narcotics and some individual counts and then,

then we have the human trafficking counts all by themselves without any -- only against Mr. Folks and with no allegation or no suggestion that they are somehow related.

So I think that's a problem that the government has in this case, is that even if you were to believe or to accept the theory that the, that the human trafficking was fueled by the drugs, the government is bound by what is in the indictment. And there is no, there is no allegation of a common scheme there.

And the third problem with that theory, as it relates to -- as being the basis for joinder, is that even if it were true that Mr. Folks used drugs and withholding drugs as a method of coercion, it's not necessarily that those go hand in hand. I accept the case law that the government cites for the proposition that, you know, feeding an addiction and controlling supply is a method of coercion, but it's not the only method of coercion under the human trafficking statute. So it's not, even if it were accepted that that's what Mr. Folks did, it's not necessarily that those go hand in hand.

And I would point the Court to the Rajaratnam decision, which I think does a nice job of distinguishing the primary case that the government relies on here, which is the Rittweger decision. And, you know, the key distinction, as the Court in Rajaratnam points out, is that

there is no allegation in that case, there was no allegation of the common scheme in the indictment. Whereas, in the Second Circuit case, the Rittweger case, there were two schemes alleged in the indictment. They were both schemes to basically defraud investors. And they were slightly different schemes, but they were alleged to have the same common purpose, which was to defraud investors out of their money into companies related in both schemes. So that decision does a nice job of distinguishing the case. And I think for the very same reasons this case doesn't fit into the Rittweger fact pattern.

And the Court in Rajaratnam pointed out that, you know, if joinder were to be allowed on the theory that the government espouses here that, you know, the drugs fueled the human trafficking, on the part of one defendant and one defendant only, with no allegation that anybody else even knew of the human trafficking, then any defendant would be subject to being joined in a criminal case with another defendant that, that had other allegations, unrelated allegations pending against them. And that's just not the law.

So under Rule 8(b) I think that the government is bound by the allegations of the indictment that it brought in this case. And the allegations in the indictment do not allege any sort of common scheme as between the drug

distribution and the human trafficking. 1 2 And, further, --3 THE COURT: But let me push back on that a little. 4 The indictment looks like most indictments, it's just a 5 skeletal recitation of the elements of the offense with the 6 names and dates and locations added in. It doesn't say 7 anything about motive or connection to other charges or, I 8 mean, it's not a narrative. It just puts you on notice of 9 the grand jury's determination that there's probable cause 10 to proceed. 11 MR. HENRY: Well, I would agree with that, Your 12 Honor, it does. But the problem with that as it relates to 1.3 Rule 8(b) is that the Court must make a decision on joinder 14 15 MS. AVERBACH: Right. 16 MR. HENRY: -- based on the indictment. And the 17 government certainly has a choice on how much information they can put into an indictment. And I think it was the 18 19 Rajaratnam Court that made the statement that, you know, if 20 the Court or if the government wants to proceed on a 21 barebones indictment that it does so at its own risk. 22 And I think that's exactly the case here. If the 23

theory was that the human trafficking was fueled by the drugs then that could have certainly been spelled in out in the indictment, which it was not. So I think that's the

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strongest reason for severance in this case. And I think it's pretty clear on the facts and the law.

And the last point I would make about Rule 8(b) is, you know, the government has likened this to comparing two different conspiracies. And I'm not sure that's actually wrong to do that, but it's worth noting that the human trafficking claims are not a conspiracy. They are, they are against Mr. Folks and Mr. Folks alone.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HENRY: With no allegation in the indictment that anybody else participated -- any of the other co-defendants, certainly not Mr. McFarlan.

know, that some of the victims will be witnesses in the drug conspiracy case and there's, there's some overlap in the witnesses. But my response to that is, first of all, again, we need to start with the indictment and not what the witnesses will testify to. But the common overlap of participants that Rule 8(b) contemplates I think pretty clearly does not contemplate witnesses. It contemplates co-defendants, actors, wrongdoers. So I don't think that that's -- to the extent that there's any overlapping witnesses between the two claims really has any bearing on this analysis under Rule 8(b).

With respect to Rule 14, should the Court find

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that the claims are properly joined, I think the strongest argument for severance under Rule 14 is the spillover, which is the second point we made and probably should have been the first point because that is really the heart of why it would be unfair to Mr. McFarlan to be joined in trial with Mr. Folks on, with these counts still in place.

You know, there are plenty of cases in the Second Circuit that acknowledge the fact that both in terms of the volume of evidence and then the nature of the evidence, the joinder can lead to unfair prejudice.

And here I think we would have both. We would have the jury sitting here for a long period of time listening to some very horrific allegations and evidence of human trafficking as against Mr. Folks only. It would not be admissible against Mr. McFarlan.

And not only would there, would I think that that testimony probably would be great, you know, that evidence would be greater in quantity than the drug conspiracy evidence. But it also has the effect of poisoning, in the jury's mind, Mr. McFarlan. To, if, you know, the jurors being human as they are, to be — to hear that evidence against one co-defendant it would be very difficult, in my view, if not impossible, for the jury to segregate in their mind the fact that Mr. McFarlan has not been alleged to have been involved in this at all.

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And so I think that that's the strongest argument. And there are plenty of cases that we cited in our papers that acknowledge that, those factors as a basis to sever under Rule 14.

And then with respect to the, to the efficiency argument raised by the government, again, we acknowledge that that, that that's an important consideration for the Court under Rule 14. But not so important, certainly, it's not an issue under Rule 8(b). I think 8(b) stands on its own and the counts are either properly joined or they are not without regard to whether it's more efficient to try the case together. But even under Rule 14 where efficiency comes into play, efficiency has its limits.

And, of course, you know, the, it would be improper for the government to try somebody for the sake of efficiency to the point that it erodes a defendant's right to a fair trial, which we think would happen here.

And, you know, if the government were forced to try two cases, one against Mr. McFarlan and one against Mr. Folks, I don't think that that's, you know, so inefficient to cause the government any undue burden here.

The case against Mr. McFarlan is relatively narrow. He is charged in the conspiracy, but the individual or the substantive counts against him relate to basically a couple of weeks time; a controlled buy and a possession

count.

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So I think Mr. McFarlan's involvement in the conspiracy was, if the government can prove a conspiracy, it's relatively short. It's a much shorter case than the case against Mr. Folks. So I don't see much to be gained in the sake of efficiency for trying these cases together, especially when you consider the prejudice to Mr. McFarlan trying the cases together.

exclude from consideration the trafficking counts that precede the drug distribution conspiracy and had it only been brought with the counts against your client for conspiracy and distribution and possession, and against a co-conspirator adding in the counts of trafficking, but all from the same timeframe, would you make the same arguments or would your case be weaker?

MR. HENRY: I would make primarily the same arguments. And the primary argument that I would rely on is the fact that there is still no common scheme alleged. There are two silos of charges without any allegation of overlap between the two except for the government's theory that they've articulated in their papers.

But, again, that's not the way Rule 8(b) works, as I understand it. I think the Court shouldn't consider what the government will argue at trial. It should look at the

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superceding indictment or the second superceding indictment
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     in this case and look to see if there's any, any common
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     scheme alleged.
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               And there clearly isn't in this case. And to the
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     extent that the common scheme is to, you know, is to
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     illegally obtain profits, you know, I think the same could
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     be said for any crime. So it has to be more than that.
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               And so, it would, it would, it, you know, it would
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     change the argument a little bit, but at the end of the day
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     the principal argument stands the same.
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               THE COURT: Okay. We haven't talked about the
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     confrontation clause issue, which is one that worries me
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    probably more than the others. But why don't I hear from
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     the government on that issue and then give you a chance to
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     respond.
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               MR. HENRY: Okay.
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               THE COURT: Because they know more really about
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     these statements than you and I do.
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               MR. HENRY: Right.
                                   Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MS. AVERBACH: Thank you, Your Honor. You just
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     want to hear me briefly on the Bruton issue or on
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     everything?
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               THE COURT: On everything. But I wanted to make
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     certain that I understand the confrontation clause.
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the one that will get it sent back.
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               MS. AVERBACH: Let me start with that. That's the
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     easiest. I view it as unlikely that we would use Folks'
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     post-arrest statement as part of our evidence, although I
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     want to reserve the right to do it. So I don't want to make
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     any final decisions as to the government's evidence now.
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               THE COURT: Right.
               MS. AVERBACH: But I can tell you I think it's
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     unlikely. It's largely not particularly helpful to our
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     case.
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               THE COURT: It usually isn't.
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              MS. AVERBACH: Pardon?
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               THE COURT: It often isn't.
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               MS. AVERBACH: Right. To the degree that there
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     are helpful portions, and we view it as important to get
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     those in --
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MS. AVERBACH: I do think that the statement could
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    be redacted to excise the portions where there are Bruton
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     issues because they are discreet parts of the statement.
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     And certainly the Court could issue limiting instructions.
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               THE COURT: Those haven't been met with much
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     affection by the Supreme Court.
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               MS. AVERBACH: You know, there's also the
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    possibility of having two juries impaneled. I have, I think
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that's such a --
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               THE COURT: That one sounds like --
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              MS. AVERBACH: -- gymnastic event.
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               THE COURT: Yeah. That would be a nightmare.
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     Right.
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              MS. AVERBACH: You know, I do think that the issue
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     is premature, but I can tell you that there is very little
     evidentiary value, from the government's perspective in
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     Folks' post-arrest statement.
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               I mean I, --
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               THE COURT: All right. It's not premature in one
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     sense that if one of several remedies for the Bruton problem
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     is severance, probably the most drastic.
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              MS. AVERBACH: True.
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               THE COURT: But that has to be made now.
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     isn't really available to me at trial.
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              MS. AVERBACH: No. But there will come a point
     where we have, you know, zeroed in on the evidence that we
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     will use a month or two months ahead of whatever trial date
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     Your Honor sets. And at that point we will have a very
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     clear view of the evidence. We are using the evidence. We
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     are not using -- or the evidence we are manipulating to use
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     in a way that accommodates the needs of every defendant at
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     the table.
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               THE COURT: I looked at Rule 14, the second
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section, which anticipates and sort of invites an in-camera
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     review, which I don't mind doing in any case, you know,
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     there's really never that much stuff, once you get into it
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     you can get through it. I worry about having enough sort of
     traction and context on the case to really understand the
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     significance of what I'm looking at.
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               MS. AVERBACH: I recently watched it. I can
     paraphrase it for you. He denies being a drug trafficker.
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     He says that he's sort of the muscle or the enforcer because
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    his reputation on the street is so significant that he's,
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     you know, able to achieve results undeveloped, nondescript
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     results without, you know, doing much more than relying on
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    his reputation.
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MS. AVERBACH: And he does know Donald McFarlan,
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    McFarlan rather, and that he knows him to bring drugs up
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     from New York City to Vermont.
               THE COURT: And then what was the last thing?
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               MS. AVERBACH: The rest of it is just denials.
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               THE COURT: Right.
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              MS. AVERBACH: Never trafficked in humans, you
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     know.
                           The part in which he, that he puts his
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               THE COURT:
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    hand on Mr. McFarlan about is what exactly?
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               MS. AVERBACH: He does, he does point the finger
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at Mr. McFarlan as a drug courier, somebody who brings drugs
up from New York to Vermont. And, frankly, in the
government's view, that's probably accurate. We do believe
that's accurate.
          THE COURT: Right. But probably not admissible.
         MS. AVERBACH: But that may be the only accurate
part of his post-arrest statement.
          THE COURT: Right. And that could be excised for
Crawford reasons?
         MS. AVERBACH: It sure could.
         THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful.
                                             Thank you.
         MS. AVERBACH: Sure. So, you know, as I looked at
it I thought the Rule 14 argument was stronger than the 8(b)
argument, but I'll take up the 8(b) argument because counsel
did a good job of arguing that point. But as I read the
law, the case law joinder is proper when you have, one,
substantial identity of facts and participants or, two, a
common scheme or plan. And in this case we have both.
have identity of facts and participants with respect to not
only the people who are charged and uncharged committing the
crimes and they are present for the crimes, but also of
victims and witnesses.
          So to put that into concrete terms of victims of
the human trafficking counts are also the baggers in the
drug conspiracy. The couriers in the drug conspiracy are
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also --
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               THE COURT: What I call the gophers.
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               MS. AVERBACH: The gophers?
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MS. AVERBACH: Gopher is not the right word.
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     Couriers means the people who transport drugs --
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               THE COURT: Right.
               MS. AVERBACH: -- interstate. It's a more
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     important job --
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MS. AVERBACH: -- than the go to guy for McDonalds
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     or the runner even whose, who does the hand to hand.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MS. AVERBACH: Okay. So the government believes
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     that Mr. McFarlan is a courier and really the second in
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     charge of the drug conspiracy under Brian Folks.
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               And there were others involved who were uncharged.
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     And the conspiracy as charged in the indictment refers to
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     others named and unnamed. Obviously, Mandy Latulippe was
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     also charged with being a part of the conspiracy. But the
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    people who are charged, McFarlan, and uncharged in the
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     conspiracy, who were men, were also serviced sexually by the
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    victims of human trafficking. That was part of the
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     expectation of Brian Folks.
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               And one of the ways that he was able to
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continually demean, demoralize, degrade, dominate, disorient, all the D. words that go into what coercion is in this world, in this landscape. Another very illustrative example is there is an uncharged bagging up party. A bagging up party is when, you know, there's a substantial amount of narcotics that needs to be packaged for individual sale.

In this case Donald McFarlan was there, Brian Folks was there, and a number of different women who were part of the drug and human trafficking businesses. And those witnesses will be able to articulate what they were doing there and why they were doing it and how they were controlled into doing such a thing.

One of the things that Brian Folks insisted on is that these women as they bagged up were naked and they only wore aprons. And that was because he wanted to make sure they couldn't steal from him, his drugs. But it was also because every time he could degrade any one of these girls he gained one more aspect of control over them, over their behavior.

And so the drugs played a very coercive role inasmuch as they were withheld from the girls in order to force the commercial sex act, but in also various ways that are far more subtle.

THE COURT: So what do you say to Mr. Henry's

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point, for which he has case law support, that in making the Rule 8 decision, I don't do what you invited me to do, which is kind of go listen to something like an opening statement and draw my conclusions about what the evidence might well be, but instead I decide that question within the limits of the indictment itself and not sort of hear a forecast of what the trial is going to look like?

MS. AVERBACH: Well, I do believe, and Mr. Henry sets this out in his papers, that this is not a settled question in the Second Circuit. The case that he was describing to you, Rajaratnam, is a Southern District case. So it's not binding upon this Court.

That Court drops a footnote in footnote two sets out 11th Circuit, the Third Circuit, the D.C. Circuit all, and perhaps others, all rely on representations by the prosecutor, other moving papers that contain factual assertions about the case and that that's proper. So this is an unsettled question in the Second Circuit.

I would argue that it's in, it makes sense to do it that way so that in the end of the day when you are charged with making a decision as to whether evidence of one is going to be evidence of the other, which is one of the analyses this Court should undertake, you make an informed decision about whether or not that's true. Because especially if you're in the Rule 14 landscape you have

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tremendous discretion which won't be overturned by the Court of Appeals unless there's been, you know, a gross miscarriage of justice --THE COURT: Right. MS. AVERBACH: -- for example. So, frankly, I think the more informed your decision can be the better decision you make with respect to these kinds of things. Rule 8(b) requires that Your Honor determine whether the commission of one offense depends on or lead to the commission of the other. And that's what we have here. Brian Folks was selling drugs for years before the dates of the drug conspiracy as charged in the indictment and up until the point where he was arrested. He also sold women during all of those times and even prior to the dates charged in the indictment with respect to the drug conspiracy, but not before he was selling drugs. So his ability to sell drugs, his ability to engage in the conspiracy to sell drugs, enabled his ability to traffic girls. I mean, the drugs acted as how he enticed them, how he lured them in. We not only charged coercion we charged fraud as a theory. And one of the theories of fraud is that he offered really vulnerable people the promise, the false promise, of a good life, a safe life, clothes, food, shoes,

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and shelter. But those things came with strings that, you know, became apparent over not very much time. And as Folks was able to, Folks and his co-conspirators were able to further the addictions of their drug customers Folks was able to exploit these really vulnerable people by withholding the drugs and saying you can't have the substance your body so desperately needs until you perform this commercial sex act. And then the drugs of the conspiracy sold were also used as punishment for the trafficked victims when they didn't do as they were told or as a reward for when they did.

So it was really the currency of the human trafficking crimes fueled by the drug conspiracy. So the customers of the drug conspiracy were all over, but also the human trafficking victims. So each one of the human trafficking victims is going to be able to testify as to what happened to her and how it happened. And as she testifies to that she will automatically give testimony about the drug conspiracy.

And in order to sort of separate that testimony out one from the other, the, I mean, it's almost impossible because you wouldn't have any frame of reference. You wouldn't understand why she made the decisions she did and why the facts, you know, unfolded as they did without understanding that she was also a victim of sex trafficking

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and vice versa. You wouldn't understand the sex trafficking
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     if you didn't understand the drug conspiracy. One really
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     depends on the other.
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               THE COURT: You would try them separately, it
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     would just be two trials that lasted a pretty long time and
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     had a lot of overlapping evidence?
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               MS. AVERBACH: Well, and that's the point.
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     Because it's the proof of the human trafficking, whether or
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     not Mr. McFarlan is charged with it, is admissible against
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    him because it's proof of the drug conspiracy. So if Your
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     Honor were to sever the defendants, the co-defendants one
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     from the other, and we would end up with two trials, but the
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     evidence would be almost identical. I mean, it would be to
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     no end because most of the human trafficking evidence is
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     admissible against Mr. McFarlan as proof of the conspiracy.
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               THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful.
                                                   Thank you.
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              MS. AVERBACH: I would just highlight for Your
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     Honor --
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               THE COURT: How do you see the Rule 14 issues?
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              MS. AVERBACH: Pardon?
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               THE COURT: How do you see the Rule 14 issues?
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              MS. AVERBACH: Yeah. I just wanted to highlight
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     one more thing, if that's okay.
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               THE COURT: Yes, of course.
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               MS. AVERBACH: The courts say over and over again
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that there's a preference of joint trials of co-defendants under 8(b). And that's particularly strong where there is a common scheme or plan alleged. That's what we have here.

Really the standard is what a reasonable person would recognize as a common factual element. And given that human trafficking is a relatively new crime under federal law, the Trafficking and Victims Protection Act hasn't been around for that long. But I think there's enough discussion about it now that courts, reasonable people can see a drug count and human trafficking count side-by-side and infer that there is reasonable overlap between those two things.

So the Rule 14 issue is an altogether separate

So the Rule 14 issue is an altogether separate inquiry, as courts have said. And that requires a determination as to whether or not there is substantial prejudice, not just prejudice, but substantial prejudice.

Because Rule 8(b) allows for some prejudice Rule 14 guards against substantial prejudice.

And if there is, this Court has three options, more than three really. But first is to order separate trials. The second is to sever the defendants. And the third is to provide any other relief that justice requires.

So that, this kind of substantial prejudice only exists when there's a serious risk that a joint trial will compromise a specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment regarding guilt or innocence.

As we've talked about with 8(b), the evidence is admissible -- evidence that is admissible against one but not the other does not necessarily require severance because Your Honor can issue limiting instructions. But in order to guard against the spillover effect, which I think is sort of the strongest concern here.

THE COURT: Right.

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MS. AVERBACH: The one we ought to be most careful about, limiting instructions throughout the trial, where the Court instructs jurors to consider evidence only against each defendant individually as to each count is proper.

And that happens in cases of this nature where one person is charged in a conspiracy that's something like a narcotics conspiracy or a gun conspiracy and other defendants are charged with the murders, the violence, the assaults.

The one particular case I'm thinking of out of the Southern District murder, potentially torture and assault, were sort of the other cases that they were worried about this prejudicial emotional spillover about.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. AVERBACH: In that case they said if the proof is admissible also as proof of the conspiracy the proper recourse and an acceptable recourse is a limiting instruction throughout because uncharged acts may be

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admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy. And that's
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     what I was trying to articulate about 8(b), that even if
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     Your Honor were to sever -- even if you found that the
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     joinder was proper under 8(b) but severed under Rule 14, the
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     effect would be not great because the so-called charged
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     evidence of the sex trafficking would be admissible in a
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     trial against Donald McFarlan for conspiracy.
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               THE COURT: Right. Presumably those counts, the
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     conduct relating to time before that started the conspiracy,
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     that would drop out?
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               MS. AVERBACH: Yes. Yes.
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               THE COURT: But you would be offering the rest of
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     it anyway?
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               MS. AVERBACH: There's either equal or more
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     overlap than not with respect to the timeframe.
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               THE COURT: At least half, right?
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               MS. AVERBACH: Yeah. And so, you know, as the
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     human trafficking victims are all housed in one place, which
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     was also the stash house for the drugs.
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MS. AVERBACH: So, you know, the description of
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     what was going on there, and who was there with respect to
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    Mr. McFarlan and Folks and who the players were and what the
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     rules were, all of those things will come out in a case
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     against McFarlan alone. So, you know, severing under Rule
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14 has no, has no effect really if that evidence is otherwise admissible.

So the risk -- I would say also that the risk of the emotional prejudice that we are concerned about with respect to the sex trafficking, that is real. I mean, the nature of this evidence is disturbing.

And you can't disentangle it from the drugs because really the drugs are part of, part of the way everybody gets through this kind of disturbing traumatic stuff by, you know, the anesthesia of the opiate.

But in this day and age of the Vermont opiate epidemic I would submit that every single person who comes into this courtroom as a prospective juror at this point, unfortunately, is probably going to know somebody of a family member, a cousin, a friend, a son, a daughter, an aunt who has an addiction to opiates or has known somebody who has overdosed from opiates.

And I don't think we can say any more that trying a drug case of this magnitude with the fallout that it has had when you see the witnesses up on the stand whose hair is coming out, you know, that's, just that visual situation is going to be extremely upsetting for people. And that's just the drug case.

So I, you know, there will be upsetting evidence from the drug case as well as the human trafficking case.

So I don't think that you can, you can separate one from the other and say one is more horrible than the other or more upsetting. But we do rely on jurors to follow instructions. We do choose them hopefully with a lot of vetting with respect to their ability to follow the law and follow Your Honor's instructions. And we do hope and expect that they will do that.

As to the charge that the volume of evidence is greater in the human trafficking case because it lasts longer, I don't actually think that that's true. There's a tremendous amount of drug conspiracy evidence that comes from a series of controlled buys which have video and audio wires, and controlled -- well, confidential informants doing transactions. There's a lot of surveillance. There's actual drugs. There's a firearm that's still uncharged in the case. There's a tremendous number of witnesses, law enforcement and lay, who will testify as to the drug conspiracy. And there's digital evidence as well. We did search warrants on devices that were recovered from Folks when he was arrested and his home. And those devices gave evidence of the drug conspiracy and the human trafficking counts.

So as you go through Brian Folks' computer you can see pictures of Donald McFarlan. And those are interspersed with folders of women and what he has collected as part of

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his commercial sex scheme which are a variety of different things, but some of them are live sex acts that Brian Folks participated in and was able to get the girls to participate in. And sometimes Donald McFarlan is in those videos.

Sometimes it's just Brian Folks.

So you cannot -- separating the sex from the drugs with respect to McFarlan would be almost an impossibility with respect to the physical evidence as well because some of the strongest evidence that we have digitally from Folks' computer intermingles those two things.

Counsel also raised, but didn't touch on today, the concern about speedy trial. I think that that's statutorily provided for where reasonable periods of delay from joinder are excluded.

And, finally, the scope of the trials and judicial economy, certainly the evidence is, the quantity of evidence is less with respect to Mr. McFarlan than it is with respect to Mr. Folks. But the nature of the proof of the conspiracy is time consuming. And so trying Mr. McFarlan alone would be a significant trial in and of itself and then trying Brian Folks alone would be another significant trial.

I don't believe that any potential spillover effect couldn't be cured with instructions from this Court.

I don't believe that it's the kind of prejudice, substantial prejudice that requires forcing these witnesses to relive

these experiences twice publicly. It's going to be hard enough to get them to do it once. For them, for their own sakes I don't think this is a case that severance is warranted.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Henry?

MR. HENRY: Yeah, I would just like to address a

couple points raised, Your Honor. First, with the issue of

the Rule 8 analysis being settled law, I do agree that the

Second Circuit hasn't expressly adopted the notion that this

decision has to be made on the indictment alone. But as we

point out in a footnote in our papers, there's a recent

unpublished Second Circuit opinion. Rittweger didn't,

didn't decide the issue, but suggested that that was the

case. And a more recent Second Circuit has suggested that

that is the Circuit's view anyway. And I, and I believe

that, you know, that that's what the Second Circuit will

ultimately hold.

With respect to the genesis argument, you know, I use the word genesis because the Eighth Circuit used it in a case that I think is very similar and addresses a very similar argument here which is, as I understand the government's position, being that the drug distributions are the genesis for the human trafficking. And in an Eighth Circuit case, Sazenski, that we cite in our papers, I just want to read to the Court one passage from the case that I

think is right on point here.

There the Court says, the government argues that there's a sufficient connection between a defendant's offenses because the cocaine, the cocaine dealings, which had occurred prior, provided the genesis of the marijuana operation which came subsequently. And because the same informant was involved in both the cocaine and marijuana transactions, we must disagree. The former argument is irrelevant. It fails to address how McDonald was connected to the cocaine dealing.

And that's the problem here, Your Honor, which is to the extent that the human trafficking claims and the drug distribution claims are somehow connected, they are so only as it relates to Mr. Folks. There is, there is no allegation that Mr. McFarlan participated or that the allegations of drug distributions against Mr. McFarlan are somehow connected to the human trafficking because there's no claim against Mr. McFarlan.

And I think, you know, ultimately that's the problem with the government's theory here, is that even if it were to be accepted that there's a connection, that connection only relates to Mr. Folks whose the only one who is alleged to have participated in the human trafficking.

So, and the other point I would like to make, Your Honor, is, I mean, I disagree with the government that a lot

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of the human trafficking evidence comes into a trial if Mr.
McFarlan is tried by himself as it relates to the drug
conspiracy. There may be some overlap in that testimony to
the extent that these, that the victims of the human
trafficking were also workers and/or customers of the drug
conspiracy. But I don't think the Court is going to permit
a lot of testimony about the horrors that they suffered at
the hands of Mr. Folks as it relates to being forced into
commercial sex acts if Mr. McFarlan is tried alone.
would disagree that there's a lot of overlap.
          So I think that under the Rule 14 analysis, you
know, I think that there's considerable risk of undue
prejudices here to Mr. McFarlan. And, you know, I do agree
with the government in the characterization of this evidence
and would suggest that that would be extremely difficult for
a rational juror to segregate his or her mind based on a
curative jury instruction.
          THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. I'll take
it under advisement. You've both given me things to think
about. And I'll get something out by the end of the week.
Appreciate it. Thanks.
         MR. HENRY: Thank you.
         MS. AVERBACH: Thank you, Your Honor.
          (The Court recessed at 2:15 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Anne Marie Henry, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court, for the District of Vermont, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand notes taken in the aforementioned matter to the best of my skill and ability.

anne Marie Henry

Anne Marie Henry, RPR Official Court Reporter